The term Black Swan is a familiar concept in the context of high consequence operations. There is the continual concern that there may be an 'as yet' undiscovered flaw or lack of understanding in the design of a product, process or facility that could lead to a catastrophic event. Concern lies in the potential incompleteness of understanding of any design concept, implementation and associated assessment. Given that 'absolute confidence' may never be possible, the question arises as to how best to continue to search for such a possible flaw with a view to subsequent removal or mitigation. This at first sight apperars to be a process without end but the level of committment must be balanced against the detrimental consequence that could ensue given that a Black Swan might exist. But when is 'enough enough'? This subject is covered in the context of the ownership of nuclear warheads where thre Black Swan can indeed be catastrophic should it exist. The paper is framed somewhat in terms of what can be learned from the general literature associated with Black Swan thinking.
